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According to the view I will call Legal Expressivism (LE), neither crime nor punishment 
consists merely in intentionally imposing some kind of harm on another. Both also have an 
expressive aspect. In terms I will be using, they are what they are in part because they enact 
attitudes towards others – in the case of crime, some kind of disrespect, at least, and in the 
case of punishment, society’s condemnation or reprobation. Indeed, punishment is justified, 
at least in part, because (and when) it uniquely expresses fitting condemnation or other 
retributive attitude. Hate or bias crimes dramatize the expressive aspect of crime, since they 
typically, and sometimes by design, send a message of inferiority to the victim’s group and 
society at large. Treating the enactment of contempt and denigration towards a historically 
underprivileged group as an aggravating factor in sentencing may be an appropriate way to 
counter this message, since it reaffirms and indeed realizes the fundamental equality of all 
members of a democratic community. 
 Elements of Legal Expressivism can be found in the work of many legal thinkers.1 
Yet virtually every aspect of the story has been called into question by critics. In this paper, I 
will refine the LE account and respond to some of the criticisms. I will begin with the notion 
of an attitude and its relation to emotion, and argue that the two should not be assimilated. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See in particular Joel Feinberg (1965), Jeffrie Murphy & Jean Hampton (1988), Jean Hampton 
(1992), Martha Nussbaum & Dan Kahan (1996), Dan Kahan (1996, 2001), Elizabeth Anderson & 
Richard Pildes (2000), Antony Duff (2001), and Christopher Bennett (2006). 
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I’ll also distinguish between two ways of expressing attitudes: enactment and symbolic 
expression. Hate crimes, in these terms, are crimes that enact hate, contempt, or disgust 
towards someone on account of identity-defining group membership. 
 How can expressing such attitudes justify enhanced punishment? I begin by 
discussing appeal to a special kind of harm caused by hate crime and expressing attitudes in 
general, and argue that no kind of additional harm suffices to provide a rationale for 
enhanced punishment for hate crime. Instead, we need to turn to the LE framework. On this 
picture, wrongdoing is not merely about causing harm, but is rather a function of attitudes 
towards others (or, equivalently, the valuations) that our actions embody. Punishment 
manifests reactive attitudes, and is justified in terms of countering the evaluation implicit in 
the criminal’s behaviour. I take up various criticisms of LE, and argue that they fail to 
damage the most plausible version, which appeals to the conceptual link between 
punishment and protecting the status of inviolability that all citizens have in a democratic 
community in justifying legal condemnation. This is a kind of mixed theory of punishment, 
since it has both backward-looking elements (punishment expresses reactive attitudes) and 
forward-looking ones (reactive attitudes are fitting because of their role in protecting the 
inviolable status of the victim). 
 Given this understanding of crime and punishment in general, we can see the proper 
place of hate crime legislation. Hate crime is a greater wrong than the parallel crime, because 
it enacts attitudes that pose a graver threat to the inviolability of all members of the target 
group. In response, the right kind of hate crime legislation reaffirms the equality of all 
citizens as a fundamental democratic value. It expresses the determination on the part of 
members of the democratic community not to allow anyone to be treated as an object of 
disgust, contempt, or disdain, as a lower kind of being merely in virtue of belonging to a 
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group that is for some reason disvalued. In so doing, it preserves the equal status of all 
citizens, since such status supervenes on enacting reactive attitudes towards violations.  
 
1. Attitudes and Their Manifestations  
I will begin with the notion of an attitude or sentiment, since it is crucial to any LE account. 
Though the term is sometimes used loosely, an attitude is distinct from an emotion or 
passion or affect. Rather, an attitude is a way of relating to someone or something that 
disposes one to have different emotions in different situations, to want certain things, to 
focus attention on certain things, to deliberate in certain ways, and possibly to make use of 
evidence in certain ways (cf. Anderson & Pildes 2000, 1509). My attitudes show how much 
I value someone or something. Thus, if I love someone, I will feel joy when she thrives and 
sadness if she suffers, I want her to do well for her own sake and am committed to doing 
things that further her good, I notice things that are opportunities or threats for her, I take 
those opportunities and threats into account in practical deliberation as reasons for action, 
and may be more likely to believe that she is excellent at her job than the evidence warrants. 
Perhaps there is a distinct feeling of love that goes with the attitude, but love itself is more 
than that feeling.  
Moreover, in the case of an attitude like love, I welcome or endorse the reactions 
associated with the sentiment, rather than being in their grip. In one sense of the word, I can 
identify with the pattern of passive responses. Only once I do so, the attitude will be 
genuinely mine. This doesn’t mean that the attitude is under direct voluntary control, but 
neither is it purely passive, as it is sometimes portrayed. In fact, there is plausibly an 
asymmetry between our control over loving someone and not loving them. We can’t will 
love into existence, but we may be able to will it out of existence. That is, if thoughts about 
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someone give rise to no positive feeling or spontaneously focus our attention, there’s nothing 
we can directly do to change that. That’s the problem with some arranged marriages. In 
contrast, if I’m already in a relationship and find myself spontaneously attracted to a co-
worker, say, I may well be able to deliberately set aside the feelings and refocus my attention 
on something else, and catch myself before falling in love. 
 Hate, as I understand it, is in many ways the mirror image of love. If I hate someone, 
I want her to do badly, whether or not it is of instrumental benefit for me. I feel bad if she 
does well, get easily angry with her, and may be delighted if misfortune befalls her. I tend to 
notice things that are opportunities or threats, and take those as reasons for action – though 
obviously in the opposite way to the case of love. In full-blown hate, I don’t regard these 
dispositions as something I want to get rid of, but embrace them, perhaps even take pride in 
them. Again, I may not be able to will hate into existence, but still able to will it out of 
existence. Perhaps I realize that I’m responding to Jewish people in the same negative way, 
regardless of their individual qualities. Insofar as I refuse the allow these feelings and 
thoughts to influence my deliberation and action, I am not a full-blown anti-semite – though 
of course, I’m not quite innocent either, until and unless the passive responses cease. 
 I don’t want to exaggerate the similarities between hate and love, however. One 
important difference between them is that hate may be entirely impersonal, as Thomas 
Brudholm (2010, 295) emphasizes – the individual characteristics of the hated person need 
not matter, if she is hated on account of belonging to a group. Relatedly, unlike resentment 
or indignation, hate does not essentially seek punishment of its target for what she’s done. 
There doesn’t have to be a wrong that should or could be repaid or forgiven, although hate 
may of course be triggered by wrongdoing as well. As Brudholm observes, even when it is a 
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kind of personal reactive attitude, hate targets the character of the person rather than 
particular actions (ibid., 306–307). 
 One important consequence of the general picture of attitudes I have introduced is 
that unlike occurrent emotions, attitudes are not transparent. It may be that you can’t be 
mistaken about whether you feel joy or sadness or rage right now, but you can be mistaken 
about whether you love someone – or whether you hate someone. When having an attitude 
goes against social norms, false belief about it may even be the normal condition. In many 
circles, anti-semitism, for example, is very disreputable, so people who are prejudiced 
towards Jews may sincerely but falsely believe that they are not. Other people can be better 
judges of our attitudes than we are ourselves. 
We can manifest or express our attitudes in two different ways. We can do so by way 
of using language or some other convention-based system of signs that is designed to convey 
our stance to others. I can express my love to my wife by telling her that I love her or by 
making her something she likes. As I use the term, the expression relation is non-causal, 
non-factive, and not necessarily intentional. Speech and symbols can express psychological 
states we don’t actually have, as happens when we’re insincere. They can also express 
attitudes we’re not aware of having or don’t mean to express. Otherwise psychoanalysts 
would go out of business. 
 The other way of expressing attitudes is acting in a way that is best made sense of by 
attributing the attitude to the agent. I’ll talk about enacting the attitude in this case to contrast 
it with symbolic expression. For example, I enact my love for someone by going out of my 
way to comfort her when she is in need, whether or not I say anything about my feelings. I 
just express the love by performing the actions that it motivates me to do. Now, as I’ve 
defined enacting, it is also potentially non-factive. It may be that what makes best sense of 
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my behaviour is an attitude I don’t actually have. It may be that what I do and the way I do it 
is such that any reasonable person, well-versed in my cultural context would conclude that I 
love someone, were they the examine my behaviour, when in fact I am entirely indifferent. 
Still, on my view, I have enacted love, and people who attributed the attitude to me would be 
justified in doing so, though mistaken about my mental states. Or, to put it differently, they 
would be mistaken about my actual attitudes, but not about the attitude embodied by my 
behaviour. It is a common mistake in this context to liken or assimilate this kind of 
expression to linguistic meaning (see e.g. Hampton 1992, Adler 2000). In enactment, 
convention plays at best an indirect role, and its pragmatic effects are very different. 
 My view belongs to what we may call the externalist family, since according to it the 
meaning of an action isn’t determined by what goes on inside the agent’s (or any particular 
interpreter’s) mind. Instead, “to grasp the expressive meaning of an act, we try to make sense 
of it by fitting it into an interpretive context ... [A] proposed interpretation must make sense 
in light of the community's other practices, its history, and shared meanings.” (Anderson & 
Pildes 2000, 1525). Think about a case of everyday jealousy. A friend of mine is a very good 
singer and musician. Recently, he went to a wedding party with his wife, who urged him to 
grab an acoustic guitar lying around. When he reluctantly did so, some twenty-something 
girls gathered around him, showering him with requests and adulation. He complied with the 
requests and welcomed the adulation, with the result that his wife subsequently accused him 
of flirting with the girls. My friend felt unfairly judged, since he wasn’t in fact interested in 
the young women (or so he says). However, his wife had a point, too: his behaviour did 
reasonably express an interest. Without going too deep into what makes for a reasonable 
interpretation, a good starting point is asking oneself about the goals that an informed and 
rational agent in the relevant cultural context would pursue by engaging in the observed kind 
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of behaviour. There will inevitably be indeterminacy here, but that is the kind of fact of life 
that must often be acknowledged in the context of law. 
 One relevant issue in this area will be whether groups of people, such as legislatures 
or courts, can have or express attitudes above and beyond the attitudes of the individuals that 
comprise them. The philosophical pendulum has swung in the direction of the legitimacy of 
attributing group attitudes (see e.g. Tuomela 2007; List & Pettit 2011). Following this 
tradition, I will take it as given that the attitudes of a collective (such as a state) are 
determined by the goals, assumptions, and inferences that enough of its relevant members 
jointly accept as the basis of collective action. As members of a group, people can take as 
given premises that they wouldn’t make use of in their personal practical or theoretical 
reasoning, which means that we can attribute to a group goals or beliefs that a minority of 
members, or no one, has. For example, military planners might agree to design an armament 
program starting from the assumption that the Chinese will have a new fighter plane in 2016, 
even if few of them personally think they will be ready yet. 
Which attitudes should be ascribe to a group, then? I will take Blackburn’s 
Credibility principle as a starting point: 
A group may be said to have been committed to a belief (goal, principle) if there is 
no way – no credible way – that the group could rationally sustain their open 
affirmations were they not also prepared to stand by the belief (goal, principle). 
(2010, 81) 
The most straightforward way a group can commit to a goal is announcing, after going 
through the procedures its members consider as authoritative, that it has decided to do such-
and-such. Thus, the European Central Bank may make it known that it will lend money to 
Greece. But Credibility also leaves room for groups having beliefs and goals (and indeed 
attitudes) that are not directly affirmed by any of the relevant spokespeople. The ECB might 
be committed to preferring a rise in unemployment to a rise in inflation, if it couldn’t 
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credibly deny such a preference, given the pattern of past and present decisions, even if it is 
never openly affirmed by anyone. 
 
2. Hate Crime and the Varieties of Harm 
No one, I think, would deny that some of the attitudes we have, such as hate or bias, are 
morally inappropriate. But should having or manifesting such attitudes be the business of the 
law, as advocates of hate crime and hate speech legislation want? Isn’t law concerned with 
our external behaviour rather than motives, as Kant, among others, argued? Is it right to 
punish one offender more strictly than another, if the only difference between them is in the 
quality of their motives? 
 The commonly accepted starting point for answering these questions is the principle 
of proportionality: deserved punishment for a crime is a function of both the degree of 
wrongdoing and the degree of culpability or responsibility (see e.g. Al-Hakim and Dimmock 
2012, 579ff). If hate crimes deserve a stricter punishment, they must either amount to a 
greater wrong or involve greater culpability. The latter, plausibly, is primarily determined by 
factors such as intentionality, presence of coercion or invincible ignorance, negligence, and 
so on. With respect to them, there is unlikely to be a systematic difference between hate 
crimes and parallel crimes. Much of the discussion about hate crime, including this paper, 
thus focuses on the difference in wrongdoing.  
What determines the degree of wrongdoing? One simple answer is that wrongdoing 
is at least in part a function of the degree of harm to others that an action causes. Perhaps 
rape is worse than sexual harassment, because it is more harmful to the victim. Along this 
line, some have defended stricter punishment for hate crimes on the grounds that they cause 
greater harm to the victim (Lawrence 1999; Iganski 2001; Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 
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476 (1993)). For example, there is some evidence that the psychological and physical harms 
of hate crime are likely to be more serious or more widespread than those of parallel crimes.  
However, Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore (2004) argue convincingly that enhanced 
punishment for hate crime cannot in fact be defended on the grounds that such crimes cause 
greater physical, psychological, collateral, or social harm than otherwise motivated crimes. 
This, they rightly point out, is a contingent matter. If a greed-motivated crime, say, causes 
the same harm, why should it be punished more lightly? Motivation here is only a poor 
proxy for what really makes for the degree of seriousness of crime, namely harm (Hurd & 
Moore 2004, 1086).2 Similarly, if it is morally worse to harm someone who is in a 
vulnerable position than someone who isn’t, this doesn’t justify differential treatment of a 
perpetrator who targets someone vulnerable because of her race, for example – it’s the 
vulnerability rather than the sort of characteristics that hate crime legislation involves that 
justifies the difference (ibid., 1097). Conversely, as Anderson and Pildes (2000) point out, 
thick-skinned victims of hate crime may be psychologically unaffected by the hate aspect. 
This leads to the ridiculous consequence that  “only the thin-skinned and psychologically 
fragile are entitled to be treated with dignity” (Anderson & Pildes 2000, 1543). So it’s no 
good to appeal to greater conventional harm to justify enhanced punishment for hate crime. 
Many defenders of hate crime legislation recognize the difficulties with appealing to 
ordinary kinds of harm, and consequently introduce a new concept of distinctive expressive 
harm. This, then, provides a rationale for enhanced punishment. As Dan Kahan puts it, “By 
imposing greater punishment on [hate] offenders, hate crime laws say that society regards 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A reviewer for this journal pointed out that one could nevertheless defend hate crime legislation on 
grounds of posing a risk of greater harm, parallel to drunk driving, for example. I think there is 
something to this suggestion. But I believe that the reason why merely imposing a risk on others 
(even when no harm actually results) can be legally punishable wrongdoing is ultimately that doing 
so expresses an inappropriate attitude towards them. Thus the wrongdoing involved in imposing risks 
is not to be understood in terms of harm but rather the Expressive Wrongdoing view sketched in 
Section 3 below. 
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the harms they impose as different from and worse than the harms inflicted by those who 
assault or kill for other reasons.” (Kahan 2001, 182) Kahan does not do much to explicate 
the different kind of harm – indeed, his considered view is better construed as a version of 
the Wrong Valuation account I discuss below. For a full discussion of what makes for 
expressive harm, we need to turn to Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes (2000).  
Anderson and Pildes’ argument proceeds as follows. They begin with the claim that 
“A person suffers expressive harm when she is treated according to principles that express 
negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her.” (Anderson & Pildes 2000, 1527) This 
definition does not by itself say what makes expression of inappropriate attitudes a non-
psychological harm for a person. Their answer draws on a link between expression of 
attitudes and social relationships: “The communication of attitudes creates social 
relationships by establishing shared understandings of the attitudes that will govern the 
interactions of the parties.” (1528) Given this, “Communications can expressively harm 
people by creating or changing the social relationships in which the addressees stand to the 
communicator” (1529), where these social relationships include “friendship and enmity, 
collegiality and rivalry, and superior and inferior caste status” (1530). So the argument 
seems to have three premises: 
1) Social relationships supervene on a shared understanding of the attitudes that govern 
mutual interactions. 
2) Shared understandings of interaction-governing attitudes result from actions that 
express attitudes. 
3) Standing in certain social relationships is bad for a person, regardless of how they 
feel about it. 
4) Hence, actions that express attitudes can harm a person via changing the relationships 
in which they stand to others. 
The first premise concerns the nature of social relationships. It says that what makes us 
colleagues, for example, is that we mutually understand that we are to relate to each other in 
	   11 
certain ways, and, perhaps, not in other ways – for example, we share an understanding that 
we won’t hate or love each other. (If we do, we don’t do so qua colleagues.) The second 
premise says that the shared understandings are created by expressing attitudes. To be sure, 
the understanding that governs our relations may not be the result of anything you and I 
specifically did. In most cases, we inherit the conception of what goes with what role from 
our cultural and historical background. But our expressive actions reaffirm and possibly 
shape the understanding we have, and perhaps the way we acquire the tradition is by way of 
expressive action. At least, this is not wholly implausible. The last bit, then, is that some 
social relationships are as such bad for us to stand in. Which relationships? Anderson and 
Pildes don’t say, but their example, not of hate crime but of expressive harm of state action, 
illustrates what they mean: 
Racial segregation sends the message that blacks are untouchable, a kind of social 
pollutant from which "pure" whites must be protected. For the communicative goal to 
be realized, its meaning must be acknowledged. This does not mean that the 
addressees must believe, approve of, or accept the message. They simply have to 
understand it. Once people share an understanding that segregation laws express 
contempt for blacks, these laws constitute blacks as an "untouchable," stigmatized 
caste. (Anderson & Pildes 2000, 1528) 
So on this view, the expressive harm of hate crime, independently of its psychological effect 
on people, consists in its manifesting attitudes toward the victim that place the offender and 
the victim in an undesirable and harmful relationship in which one dominates the other. If 
that is the case, enhanced punishment is justified on the basis of greater wrongdoing than in 
the parallel crime. 
 As Section 4 will show, I find much that is congenial about this picture. However, I 
don’t believe it will quite suffice. Some social relationships may be all about how we feel 
about each other: what makes us lovers is that we love each other. But other relationships 
involve more than a shared understanding of interaction-governing attitudes, and some of 
those are highly relevant in the context of hate crime. Relationships of domination and 
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subordination and oppression, in particular, may exist in the absence of such understanding. 
I may think that I am the social or legal equal of someone above me in a hierarchy – and in 
some cases, they may think the same way – but sadly, that isn’t sufficient to make us equals. 
Relationships of relative power do not reduce to how we understand.  
The problem for Anderson and Pildes is that to claim that simply understanding that 
the behaviour of others expresses contempt towards me as a disabled person, for example, 
while nevertheless not accepting that it is in any way merited, suffices to make me 
stigmatized or disadvantaged makes little sense. Instead, being dominated or subordinated is 
a status that one may have. As I will argue in the next section, status does not supervise just 
on attitudes that others express towards me, but on how society, and the law in particular, 
responds to those attitudes. What matters for status is not just symbolic communication but 
concrete enactment through punishment. 
 
3. Punishment, Expression, and Inviolability 
If the arguments of the previous section are correct, it is not greater or different kind of harm 
that makes hate crime deserve enhanced punishment. A different understanding of both 
crime and punishment is called for. This is what Legal Expressivism promises. Proponents 
of this type of view emphasize that both crime and punishment have an attitudinal or 
communicative dimension. It is common for proponents to begin with the observation that 
merely causing harm or loss to another, even if done intentionally, does not suffice for 
punishable crime. Instead, we need to look at the attitudes expressed by the perpetrator. 
Many emphasize that these attitudes embody a mistaken evaluation of the victim’s worth. As 
Dan Kahan puts it,  
what moves us to condemn an actor for harming another isn’t the simple perception 
that her actions have diminished another person’s welfare, but rather the judgment 
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that her actions express too low a valuation of the other person’s worth relative to the 
actor’s own ends. (Kahan 2001, 181; cf. Kahan and Nussbaum 1996, 351–2) 
Kahan draws on the work of Jean Hampton, who argues that treating someone in a way that 
is precluded by her value or represents her as less valuable than it is “diminishes” her value, 
and simultaneously represents the agent as elevated with respect to the victim (Hampton 
1992, 1672–7; cf. Murphy & Hampton 1988, 44-5, 124). Note that this is not the same as the 
victim feeling demeaned or insulted, or losing self-respect. Nor does it require that the 
perpetrator intends to diminish the value of the victim – that’s not what a pickpocket has in 
mind. The wrongdoing involved in crime is a function of the valuation it expresses rather 
than harm alone. Call this the Wrong Valuation account of wrongdoing. 
 Let me be explicit that on this view, wrongdoing is a matter of the attitude enacted by 
the action, or what some call its social meaning. Since I’ve endorsed an externalist construal 
of social meaning, this view is a target of the following objection raised by Hurd and Moore: 
[Externalist] construals of social meaning … would make a defendant more 
blameworthy (and thus deserving of greater punishment) not because of any fact 
about him or his deed; rather, he would be subjected to increased punishment 
because of the appearance of there being a fact about him, namely, the appearance 
that he possessed a hateful or bigoted motivation for his crime (regardless of whether 
he in fact possessed such a motivation). (Hurd & Moore 2004, 1107) 
Hurd and Moore argue that such appearance could not possibly justify punishment, 
especially when false. However, their reading misconstrues the externalist view. There is a 
fact about the deed – for example, that it is disrespectful of someone. This fact is nothing 
other than the fact that it would be reasonably taken to be so by someone aware of the 
features of the action and context. Blameworthiness is a separate issue. For Legal 
Expressivism, what makes the action as potential reason for blame in the first place is that it 
(objectively) expresses bad attitude or wrong valuation.3 Someone who performs a hateful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Hampton holds a similar view: “[T]he message of the action and the actuality of what it 
accomplishes is not only something that we understand apart from the victim's reaction to it, but also 
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act, for example, without realizing it is such (and thus not acting out of hate) may be excused 
on ordinary grounds – the act wasn’t intentional under the description, the agent was 
invincibly ignorant of the social meaning of the act, and so on. 
 The next step is that punishment expresses what Peter Strawson (1962) labeled 
reactive attitudes – attitudes towards the attitudes or quality of the will that the agent has 
expressed by his action. Such attitudes can meaningfully be attributed to groups on the basis 
of goals and assumptions that their representatives could not credibly disavow, given their 
behaviour. In the case of punishment, the reactive attitudes are those of the community 
through authoritative representatives. A classic formulation is given by Joel Feinberg’s 
definition of punishment, though Feinberg gives it a more conventionalist twist than 
necessary: 
Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and 
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, either on the part of 
the punishing authority himself or of those “in whose name” the punishment is 
inflicted. (Feinberg 1965, 400) 
For Legal Expressivists, expressing reactive attitudes is what makes something a 
punishment. In Antony Duff’s words, punishment is “a mode of moral communication with 
offenders that seeks to persuade them to repent their crimes, to reform themselves, and to 
reconcile themselves with those they have wronged.” (2001, 116) Some critics argue that 
expressing public condemnation is not a sufficient account of punishment, since punishment 
necessarily involves hard treatment, and resentment can be expressed without it. Nathan 
Hanna, for example, argues that we might express our condemnation by requiring payment 
of court costs or compensation (Hanna 2008, 137) or by confining people in a way 
comparable to involuntary psychiatric treatment, and thus without intending to cause 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
something that we "read off of" the action regardless of the psychological peculiarities of a 
wrongdoer's psychology that led him to commit the wrong.” (Hampton 1992, 1684) 
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suffering (Hanna 2009, 242).4 Call this the Enactment Problem: Why does the condemnation 
have to be enacted by hard treatment rather than merely symbolically expressed?  
Putting the Enactment Problem aside for now, the expressive account of punishment, 
as such, leaves open the question of whether and how punishment is justified. The traditional 
justifications for punishment appeal either to the intrinsic value of the perpetrator’s suffering 
and the perpetrator’s deserving pain (retributivism) or to the benefits of hard treatment, such 
as the good social consequences of deterrence or incapacitation (consequentialism). An 
expressivist understanding of crime and punishment need not appeal to a new kind of 
justification altogether, but may instead provide a different insight into existing models 
(Kahan 1996, 601). 
Jean Hampton’s take on retributivism is a good example of this. For her, crime sends 
a message, and punishment counters or contradicts it with its own message. Hampton’s case 
for this draws on the Wrong Valuation account of wrongdoing. The criminal’s action makes 
a false moral claim and denies moral reality. Retributive punishment is “the defeat of the 
wrongdoer at the hands of the victim … that symbolizes the correct relative value of 
wrongdoer and victim” (Murphy & Hampton 1988, 125). It need not involve the infliction of 
pain (though that’s often part of it), but rather mastering the would-be master himself in 
order to “deny the wrongdoer's false claim to superiority and to assert the victim's equal 
value” (ibid., 126). Thus, punishment can “annul the message” (ibid., 131) sent by the crime. 
Similarly, Kahan says, “The proper retributive punishment is the one that appropriately 
expresses condemnation and reaffirms the values that the wrongdoer denies.” (1996, 602) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 One argument, put forward by Christopher Bennett, is that reactive attitudes as such involve 
“commitment to retribution, to the thought that it is non-contingently a good thing that those who 
have done wrong should undergo certain forms of suffering” (Bennett 2002, 147). For Bennett, this 
suffering that reactive attitudes seek is of two main varieties: the pain of social isolation, and the pain 
of guilt. Hanna denies this analysis of reactive attitudes. My sympathies are on Bennett’s side, but I 
lack the space for proper discussion here. 
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 I believe Hampton’s view is on the right track. But it places too much weight on 
communicating a message about the relative value of the criminal and the victim, and the 
“evidence” that such a message supposedly provides (Hampton 1992, 1676). There is more 
than mere communication at stake, or so I will argue. Further, instead of Hampton’s Wrong 
Valuation account of wrongdoing, I adopt the more general Expressive Wrongdoing view: 
wronging others is a matter of enacting inappropriate or unfitting attitudes towards them 
(where inappropriateness need not be understood in terms of value). 
Punishment and Inviolability 
To find an expressive rationale for punishment, we need not just look at what punishment 
says about the perpetrator, but also what it says about the victim. After all, punishment also 
sends a message to the victim: we, the community, will not let others enact disrespect 
towards you with impunity; we’ll stand up for you. This is also suggested, but not fully 
developed, by Hampton, who notes that “whatever one's theory of human worth is, I am 
suggesting that societal punishment practices should be seen as created and designed to 
protect it” (Murphy & Hampton 1988, 141). 
 What is at issue is a special kind of value, which I’ll call inviolability. Inviolability is 
a deontic status that something may have. To be inviolable is to be such that there are certain 
things others are not permitted to do to you. I will take it for granted that human beings are 
by default de jure inviolable: it is morally wrong to do certain things to them. For example, 
other things being equal, it is wrong to hurt someone against her will. If someone is treated 
in an impermissible way, then, other things being equal, it is de jure fitting to impose some 
kind of negative sanction on the agent. This is a conceptual truth: what it is to have a certain 
status is for sanctions for certain violations to be appropriate (and conversely, for sanctions 
for certain behaviours to be inappropriate – part of what it is to have the status of being the 
	   17 
owner of something is for it to be inappropriate for others to interfere with your using it). 
Normative status and fittingness (or unfittingness) of sanctions are simply two sides of the 
same coin. Calling something impermissible and then saying that no sanction is fitting 
amounts to contradicting oneself, unless there is an excuse or exemption for the agent. 
 Our inviolability confers us a kind of dignity or worth that is good for us 
independently of our actually being harmed. This is something that Thomas Nagel 
emphasizes when he says that  “not only is it an evil for a person to be harmed in certain 
ways, but for it to be permissible to harm the person in those ways is an additional and 
independent evil.” (Nagel 2002, 38) In a similar spirit, Frances Kamm (2005) talks about the 
importance of our inviolability over and above the importance of not being actually violated.  
Moral inviolability is something that we can’t lose as a result of the action of others, 
but we can meaningfully speak of a kind of de facto inviolability that we may or may not 
possess. What strips us of our de facto inviolability is not merely that someone harms us or 
wrongs or disrespects us. But if others can disrespect me with impunity or with a mere slap 
on the wrist, I will have little dignity left. Our de facto inviolability is thus constituted not by 
the fact that others treat us as rational and autonomous agents or fail to do so, but by the fact 
that others must, on pain of external sanction, treat us as such. This is the sense in which law 
can confer on us a social standing that befits an equal member of a democratic community. It 
can’t stop others from engaging in a disrespectful behaviour such as stealing or assault, but it 
can penalize such behaviour and thereby manifest respect for everyone. If, conversely, the 
law didn’t penalize such behaviour against a particular group, leaving them open to attack 
with impunity, that would amount to denying them equal respect and thereby constituting 
them as having a lower standing than others, even if no one ever actually attacked them.  
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So victim-focused LE says that enacting retributive attitudes is justified, because it is 
the only way to maintain or establish the victim’s de facto status as inviolable – to guarantee 
that the victim de facto has the inviolability she already has de jure. Merely symbolically 
expressing censure of the perpetrator or respect for the victim does not suffice to establish 
the status. I emphasize that this is not a psychological but, as it were, a logical matter: to 
have a certain status is for it to be the case that behaviours inconsistent with it are 
sanctioned. To be inviolable is to be someone towards whom no one can violate without 
punishment – if someone enacts disrespect toward you, the state will enact condemnation of 
the perpetrator. Inviolability is a matter of degree, and as Hampton points out in her parallel 
discussion (1988, 141), historically certain groups of people – rich, white, male – have 
enjoyed higher de facto inviolability, since punishment for disrespecting them has been surer 
and harder. From this perspective, the Enactment Problem turns on a normative question: 
whether hard treatment is a proper expression of societal reactive attitudes depends on how 
inviolable the victims should be treated as, since inflicting suffering on a perpetrator is a way 
of expressing respect for the victim. 
 Let us turn to potential challenges to this account. First, Matthew Adler considers 
something like victim-focused LE in his discussion of Hampton. On his reading, Hampton 
says that wrongdoing “has led the community to believe that the victim has lesser moral 
worth” (2000, 1424), and punishment is necessary to reverse this status harm. He then has an 
easy time showing that punishment may not be the best or only way to change community 
norms and beliefs. But this misses the point altogether. The problem isn’t that wrongdoing 
results in false beliefs about the victim’s status, but that enacting disrespectful attitudes, if 
not countered, actually changes the (de facto) status itself. 
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 Second, victim-focused justification of expressive punishment also avoids what I’ll 
call the Illiberality Challenge. This challenge is that if punishment condemns the moral 
quality of the perpetrator’s attitudes-expressed-in-action, it oversteps the boundaries of 
political liberalism, which requires moral neutrality. Bennett, for example, justifies state 
denunciation by appeal to “a model of the responsible or virtuous citizen, a model that 
represents an individual with concerns and attitudes consonant with the defining 
authoritative values of the polity”, and says that “criminal law therefore enjoins people to 
live up to this model” (2006, 301). Though Bennett believes this is consistent with Kantian 
liberalism, the perfectionist worries of critics like Hurd (2001) are understandable. The 
victim-focused view, in contrast, does not need to appeal to moral improvement of the 
perpetrator as justification. The state must condemn crime in order to enact respect for the 
victim as an inviolable member of the community. There could hardly be a more liberal 
rationale for punishment. 
 
4. Responding to Hate 
In the previous section, I defended an Expressive Wrongdoing account of crime and a 
victim-focused Legal Expressivist account of the nature and justification of punishment in 
general. I will now argue that it provides the most promising framework for thinking about 
hate crime legislation. 
 On the Expressive Wrongdoing view, what makes something a crime is that it enacts 
attitudes that are incompatible with the legal status the victim enjoys as a citizen or occupant 
of a particular role. Unless society in turn expresses its rejection of such attitudes, the 
victim’s status really is lowered: she is someone to whom it is (legally) acceptable to do such 
things. On victim-focused LE, this is what justifies punishment, in proportion to the victim’s 
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status and the seriousness of the violation. Ordinary crime, motivated typically by perception 
of self-interest or a personal grudge, poses a threat to the victim’s inviolability only as a side 
effect, however. The victim’s status is no part of the criminal’s concern.5 
Hate crime is different. The attitudes it enacts – contempt, hate, disgust – contain an 
evaluation of the victim, by virtue of who she is (and hence everyone else who shares the 
relevant characteristic), as inferior. Contempt, for example, presents its object as ranking low 
in worth as a person, by the lights of some ideal the contemner (perhaps wrongly) endorses, 
in Michelle Mason’s apt formulation (Mason 2003, 241).6 In that sense, at least, these 
attitudes aim at lowering the status of the victim and those like her. And if those who are in 
positions of authority in the society do not respond to this appropriately, they do succeed. It 
does not suffice to reject the disrespect towards the victim that all crimes manifest to cancel 
out the hate and contempt. Indeed, failing to respond to this aspect of the crime leaves other 
members of the society complicit with it. So my main argument for hate crime legislation 
goes as follows: 
1. Committing a base crime against someone as an interchangeable member of a group 
regardless of personal profit or pre-existing personal relationship manifests an 
attitude of disgust, contempt, hostility, or hate, for short rejection as an equal member 
of a democratic community, toward all members of the victim’s group. 
 
2. A criminal justice system that fails to impose an additional sanction for a crime that 
manifests rejection as an equal itself manifests indifference on the part of the public 
toward the rejection. 
 
3. Social or legal status is in part constituted by dispositions to sanction manifestations 
of attitudes. 
 
4. So, manifesting public indifference to rejection as an equal constitutes the status of 
all members of the victim’s group as inferior, making the public complicit in the hate 
aspect of the crime. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 As a reviewer for this journal pointed out, this is not true of all non-hate crimes. I accept that my 
argument generalizes to some non-hate crimes, but lack the space to explore the implications here. 
6 Mason believes that contempt can be morally justified, if the ideal of the person is justified, and if 
the object really does fall short of it. I take it as a given that these conditions are not met in the case 
of hate crime. 
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5. Having an inferior status is in itself bad for a person, regardless of other physical or 
psychological harm. 
 
6. So, equal respect for persons requires an additional sanction for the hate element of a 
crime. 
The first premise delineates some of the grounds for concluding that a crime expresses a 
demeaning or degrading attitude toward a group in addition to whatever disrespect or 
disregard the base crime already manifests. If you burn my house because it’s in the way of a 
new development you want to build, you disrespect me; if you burn my house because you 
don’t want my kind to live in the neighbourhood, you also show contempt and disgust 
toward me and my people. The second premise points to the link between imposing 
sanctions and the attitudes of the public this manifests. The third one links sanctions to 
status, as discussed above. The fourth premise draws the preliminary conclusion that the 
public’s attitudes manifested by the failure to sanction the hate aspect constitute the victim’s 
group as inferior to others. This is a strong claim, of course. But it seems to parallel the case 
with disrespect: again, if we do nothing (or react only verbally) while someone is being 
assaulted, for example, or adopt norms that fail to direct us to do anything, we are thereby 
making the victim into someone de facto insignificant. If we do nothing to react to the hate 
or contempt aspect manifested by the hate crime, we acquiesce with the treatment of the 
victim as less significant than others, thereby lowering her de facto status. 
 The fifth premise says that an inferior status is bad in itself. In the real world, having 
such a status and being aware of it is of course also psychologically harmful. If you realize 
that no one is going to do anything if you are raped or beaten, this will have effects beyond 
the rape and beating itself. But as Nagel and Kamm pointed out, lacking inviolability is bad 
in itself. To put the point differently, it amounts to being dominated by another. As Philip 
Pettit (1997) has famously argued, even a slave who is never actually interfered with is 
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worse off than a free person, since the owner is always in a position to interfere with the 
slave’s life on arbitrary grounds.  
The conclusion, then, is that equal respect for persons, the kind of attitude that any 
legitimate liberal state is required to manifest toward all citizens, requires that crimes that 
embody hate or prejudice are punished more seriously than parallel crimes that do not 
embody the same attitudes. Contrary to a claim popular with critics, this is not punishment 
for having an attitude, but for enacting it, and furthermore enacting it in a way that is 
independently disrespectful of others in a way that merits state intervention (and thus should 
be criminalized in any case). Again, wrongdoing doesn’t consist merely in harming others, 
but doing so in a way that embodies a devaluing attitude. Laws such as the Wisconsin Hate 
Crime Statute (Wis. Stat. § 939.645) that prescribe increased penalties for intentional 
selection of the victim on the basis of perception of protected characteristics seem to target 
the right thing. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued in defence of the view that both crime and punishment should be 
understood in expressive terms in general. Part of this defence was distinguishing the 
different ways in which attitudes can be expressed, symbolic expression and enactment. I 
have argued that although attitudes of hate or bias are in themselves beyond the rightful 
scope of legislation, those who manifest them by way of performing actions that are 
independently wrong and are reasonably interpreted as aiming to lower the status of their 
victims are morally liable to suffer enhanced punishment in order to protect the equal status 
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of the victim’s group.7 In order for us all to live in a society of equals, we must express our 
rejection of the rejection of equality that hate crime enacts by more than just words. 
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